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Abstract: We examine the relationship between the number of bank relationships and firms’ performance, 
evaluating possible differential effects related to firms’ size. Our sample of firms from Italy includes many 
small firms, 99 percent of which are not listed and for which bank debt is a major source of financing. In 
the sample, 4 percent of the firms have a single bank relationship, and 66 percent of them have five or 
fewer relationships. We find that return on equity and return on assets decrease as the number of bank 
relationships increases, with a stronger relationship for small firms than for large firms. We also find that 
interest expense over assets increases as the number of relationships increases. Particularly for small 
firms, our results are consistent with analyses indicating that fewer bank relationships reduce information 
asymmetries and agency problems, which outweigh negative effects connected to holdup problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The contemporary literature on relationship banking has developed along two main branches 
corresponding to the lender’s and the borrower’s side of the issue. In his review of this topic, Boot 
(2000) characterises relationship banking and evaluates its associated costs and benefits from the 
lender’s point of view. Ongena and Smith (2000) review the other side of the coin, focusing their 
analytical review mainly on the effects of bank relationship on customers. This paper shares this 
latter point of view and focuses on the effect of bank relationships on firms’ performance. 
Recent theoretical models imply that firms with multiple bank relationships are less profitable 
than firms with fewer relationships. On the other side, empirical results on the effect of bank 
relationships on firms’ performance are mixed. Using Norwegian data, Degryse and Ongena (2001) 
find a negative relationship between the number of bank relationships and firms’ performance; 
using Japanese data, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) find the opposite result, a positive relationship 
between the number of bank relationships and firm profitability. 
In their review of the evidence on bank relationships, Ongena and Smith (2000) summarize 
various estimates of the average number of bank relationships per firm across countries and data 
sets. The main features they highlight are 1. multiple bank relationships are a common feature in 
nearly all the data sets; 2. small firms tend to have fewer bank relationship than large firms; and 3. 
country effects exist, e.g. firms in the United Kingdom, Norway and Sweden have fewer 
relationships than firms in Italy, Spain, Belgium and Portugal.  
In this paper, we try to resolve the following set of questions: How do bank relationships affect 
firm performance? Is a single bank relationship associated with better performance than 
relationships with multiple banks? Does the duration of relationships affect performance? Does size 
affect such relationships and familiarity with their banks?   2
We empirically test these hypotheses using a rich data set, the Capitalia Survey which provides 
information on banking relationships for a sample of about 4500 Italian manufacturing firms
1. We 
think that this analysis can contribute to the debate because of some characteristics of the Italian 
economy. First, the predominance of smaller firms makes it possible to test the effect of the number 
of banks on small firms’ performance. Second, over 95 percent of the firms report multiple lending 
relationship, similar to many other continental EU countries but in contrast with the Norwegian data 
studied by Degryse and Ongena (2001) in which only 30 percent of the firms have more than one 
bank. Third, most of the firms are not listed on a stock exchange. 
We construct five different proxies for firms’ performance and find that performance generally 
declines with the number of relationships, a relationship that is clear for small firms but is not as 
strong for medium and large firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature. Section 3 describes the data, the empirical specification and presents the 
estimates. Section 4 concludes.  
BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
A. Theory 
Part of the literature on the value of a close relationship between a firm and a bank is premised 
on observations by Fama (1985) and James (1987) that bank loans to firms are based on information 
that is not widely available compared to other forms of financing. The relationship between a firm 
and a bank can help to  overcome information asymmetries and agency problems that create 
liquidity constraints and can reduce firms’ investment (Fazzari et al., 1988; Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995).  
These theories suggest that screening and monitoring by banks can overcome information and 
incentive problems and reduce liquidity constraints for borrowers (Leland and Pyle, 1977; 
                                                 
1 The Survey has been previously known as Mediocredito Centrale Survey   3
Diamond, 1984; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993).  A bank relationship – a continuing contact 
between the financial institution and the firm for the provision of financial services beyond simple, 
anonymous transactions – is associated with the collection of information that can be used to make 
decisions about the evolution of the contract terms (Berger and Udell, 1998). On the other hand, 
banks could disseminate, intentionally or incidentally, confidential information to firms’ 
competitors and borrowing firms may need to consider negative effects of dissemination of 
confidential information
2. 
Given these preliminary considerations, the main issue that arises is the potential benefit of this 
relationship for the borrower and the bank. This benefit has to be evaluated taking into account the 
influence of external factors such has the competitiveness of the environment, the degree of 
technological diffusion, and the level of financial market development. 
Theoretical analyses suggest that a close relationship between banks and firms which reduces 
information asymmetries and improves firms’ access to credit can lead to an overall improvement in 
their performance. Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) show that the threat of future credit rationing can 
reduce moral hazard. Diamond (1991) shows that reputation building through bank borrowing can 
provide certification, which can allow a firm to eventually raise funds on public markets. This 
benefit of a successful bank relationship raises the cost of default on a bank loan and lowers the 
equilibrium probability of default. A bank relationship also can reduce agency problems because the 
risk of a reduction in the amount of bank loans is an incentive for managers to pursue less risky 
projects (Rajan, 1992)
3. On the same line, von Thadden (1995) shows that the efficiency of 
investment is improved by a debt contract with periodic monitoring. Moreover, borrowing from 
                                                 
2 Rheinbaben and Ruckers (2004) theoretically show that the number of bank relationships increase in firm age and size.   
3 Boot and Thakor (1994) examine optimal contract design in a model in which banks provide firms with contracts that 
require initial high collateral and interest payments that fall when the bank has verified the successful completion of 
financed projects.   4
banks allows firms to keep information confidential, not requiring the widespread disclosure typical 
of others sources of financing
4.  
This line of argument suggests that a closer bank relationship will be associated with better firm 
performance and that a small firm’s optimal strategy is to establish a long term relationship and to 
borrow from one or perhaps a limited number of banks. The empirical observation of multiple, 
time-varying relationships, however, led economists to consider other factors. 
If a bank and a firm have a long-term relationship, the bank can acquire a great deal of unique 
information about a firm and the bank may be able to exploit this, a problem which is called a hold-
up problem in game theory. Various theoretical contributions emphasise the information-capture 
problems and the presence of fixed costs associated with the search for a new bank. On the one side, 
Sharpe (1990) suggests that long lasting bank and firm relationships arise because high quality 
firms are “informationally captured”, meaning that the firms are unable to convey information about 
their quality to other banks. On the other side, Blackwell and Santomero (1982) highlight the inertia 
linked to search costs borne by a firm looking for a new source of funds. In a repeated game with 
moral hazard and adverse selection, Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that the reduction of the 
interest rate due to information acquired about the borrower is limited in more concentrated credit 
markets, and motivate this result arguing that these markets are characterised by more severe hold-
up problems. Von Thadden (1998) shows that a single bank with better information about a firm 
can impose hold-up costs that can adversely affect the borrowers’ value. These additional costs can 
be lessened or eliminated by multiple banking relationships. 
The duration of relationships between firms and banks also plays a role. Greenbaum et al. 
(1989) present a model that includes search costs for firms looking for new banks and show that the 
borrowing rate is a non-decreasing function of the duration of the credit relationship and that the 
probability that a firm will terminate a relationship is positively associated with its duration. 
                                                 
4  This is particularly important for innovating and R&D investing firms, as highlighted by Yosha (1995) and   
Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995).   5
Longhofer and Santos (2000) demonstrate how during a recession firms that have ongoing 
relationships with a bank are better able to obtain additional financing, allowing them to weather the 
recession with minimal loss.  
These effects of relationship between banks and firms are likely to be more important for 
relatively small firms, because these firm have a higher cost -- often prohibitively higher -- of 
obtaining investment funds from financial markets and rely heavily on banks as primary credit 
sources. Small firms tend to borrow from banks and to concentrate their borrowing with a few 
banks with which they have a long-term relationship. These relationships are an important feature 
of small business lending. As noted by Berger and Udell (1998), perhaps the most important 
characteristic defining small business finance is informational opacity: small firms usually do not 
enter into contracts that are publicly visible, do not have audited financial statements and 
consequently can have difficulty building reputations to signal high quality. Since there may be 
little public information available on small firms, relationship lending enables banks to collect 
private information on the credit-worthiness of these firms (Strahan and Weston, 1998). These 
factors suggest that relationship lending may be particularly beneficial for small firms, including 
lower cost or greater availability of credit, protection against credit crunches, and the provision of 
implicit interest rate or credit risk insurance. 
On the other side, for a small firm with a single relationship, an interruption of the credit line 
from the bank can be interpreted as a bad signal about the firm even if the withdrawal of the credit 
is not linked to financial distress of the small business but others are uncertain about the reason for 
the credit withdrawal. As a result, small firms may have multiple banking relationships, which have 
higher transactions costs but also greater benefits than a single relationship (Berger and Udell, 
1998).   6
B. Empirical  Literature 
Although the empirical implication of recent theoretical models seems to be in favour of single 
versus multiple relationships lending, we have shown in the previous section how the value of a 
single and close bank firm relationship remains unclear. A brief review of the empirical literature 
adds complexity to the issue by highlighting contrasting results. 
Studies of financial markets’ responses to announcements of bank loans usually indicate a 
positive effect of bank loans on firms’ value (Best and Zhang 1993; Shockley and Thakor 1998.) 
Analysis of bank lending behaviour focused on banks’ liabilities  suggest that, thanks to their access 
to core deposits, banks can protect themselves from exogenous shocks and consequently insulate 
long-term borrowers from exogenous credit shocks (Berlin and Mester, 1999). 
There are exceptions. For example, Kang and Stulz’s (2000) results for a sample of Japanese 
firms indicate better performance for firms not financed by banks compared to firms with high 
shares of bank debt. 
Empirical evidence on the effects of single versus multiple banking relationships on firms’ 
performances is mixed. Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998) find evidence that liquidity constraints 
are relatively less frequent among firms borrowing from a limited number of banks, with a resulting 
positive impact on firms’ performance. Petersen and Rajan (1994) find that multiple bank 
relationships are associated with higher interest payments and more credit constraints. Using a data 
set on Norwegian publicly listed firms, Degryse and Ongena (2001) find a negative two way 
correspondence between the number of relationships and sales profitability and also find that firms 
deciding to switch from single to multiple relationships are on average smaller and younger than 
firms choosing not to switch. Fok, Chang and Lee (2004) apply the Degryse and Ongena 
methodology for a sample of Taiwanese firms and find a negative link between firms’ performance 
and the number of bank relationships, consistent with Degryse and Ongena’s results. 
Harhoff and Korting (1998) and Cole (1998) report increasing limits to credit access for firms 
borrowing from more than one bank. In sharp contrast with these findings, Houston and James   7
(1996) find a negative correlation between firm’s reliance on single banks and growth potential and 
evidence that firms with one banking relationship also face more credit constraints than those with 
multiple relationships. 
Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2000) suggest that multiple banking relationships can diversify 
liquidity risk. By empirically testing a model of the optimal number of bank relationships, they find 
that multiple bank relationships decreases the probability of an interruption of funding due to a 
lender’s internal problems. 
Turning to the empirical literature that investigates the impact of bank relationship on small 
firms’ performance, data for the United States, Japan and almost all European Union (EU) countries 
indicate that small firms tend to borrow from fewer banks than large firms (Ongena and Smith, 
2000). This is in line with theoretical models which suggest that relationship lending can have a 
number of benefits for small firms including lower cost or greater availability of credit due to 
efficient gathering of information, protection against credit crunches and provision of implicit 
interest rate or credit risk insurance (Berger and Udell, 1998). 
Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) empirically show how Argentinean firms tend to borrow from 
more than one bank when their primary bank is financially distressed and that smaller firms prefer 
exclusive lending relationships.  
Based on U.S. data, Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that small and young firms tend to be less 
credit constrained and to receive better lending rates when they borrow from one bank. This result 
is stronger in more concentrated credit markets, suggesting that small borrowers may be worse off 
with competition among banks. Cole’s (1998) evidence indicates that the existence of a single bank 
relationship increases the probability of extension of credit for small businesses in the U.S.  
Ongena and Smith (2001) in their study of publicly traded Norwegian firms find that the 
probability of ending a bank relationship increases over time, suggesting a corresponding decrease 
in the value of the relationship. Surprisingly, the shortest relationships are those of young, small and 
highly leveraged borrowers that usually are considered to be highly dependent on bank financing.   8
These effects altogether lead to a conclusion that firms do not seem to become locked into bank 
relationships, which could be interpreted as raising some doubt about the value of bank 
relationships. 
  Some more general results suggest that long term relationships improve the conditions for 
credit access by reducing both funding costs (Berger and Udell, 1995; Elsas and Krahnen, 1998) 
and collateral requirements (Berger and Udell, 1995; Harhoff and Korting, 1998; Degryse and Van 
Cayseele, 2000). Berlin and Mester (1997) show how loan rate smoothing in response to interest 
rate shocks is part of an optimal long term contract between a bank and a firm. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Sample 
The data in this paper are from the Capitalia Survey, which is one of the most important 
qualitative and quantitative information sources on Italian firms. This survey contains yearly data 
and has been repeated every three years since 1989 for a sample of about 4500 firms. 
In this study, we focus on the most recent wave of these annual surveys conducted in 1998, 
1999 and 2000 of a sample of 4680 Italian manufacturer firms with more than nine employees. This 
wave contains information on bank relationships that were not included in the previous ones.  After 
checking for inconsistencies, we obtain an unbalanced sample including 3566 firms for 1998, 3601 
firms for 1999 and 3597 firms for 2000, with a total of 10764 firm-year observations
5. 
In order to investigate the relationship between the number of bank relationships and firm 
performance focusing on the differential effects linked to firm size, we divide the full sample into 
size classes based on the number of employees. Small firms (10 to 50 employees) are 76.5 percent 
                                                 
5 From the total sample, we select firms for which complete balance sheet and income statement data are available. We 
select firms with positive values of total assets, net worth and net sales. In order to eliminate the influence of extreme 
values, we discard observations according to the following rules: 1. return on equity (ROE) greater than 100 percent or 
lower than -20 percent; 2. return on assets (ROA) greater than 30 percent  or lower than -20 percent; 3. ratio of total 
sales to total assets greater than 300 percent or lower than 20 percent; and 4. the number of bank relationships greater 
than 50.   9
of the total sample; medium firms (51 to 250 employees) are 17.2 percent of the total; and large 
firms (greater than 250 employees) are 6.3 percent of the total. 
Information on the number and duration of bank relationships is based on the firms’ answers to 
questions on the number of banks with which they had commercial relationships at the end of 2000 
and the number of years for which a bank has been their main lender. During the period considered, 
4 percent of the firms have a single bank relationship, 63 percent have two to five bank 
relationships, and the remaining 33 percent have six or more bank relationships. Looking at the 
same variables taking into account size classes, we find a higher percentage of single bank 
relationships for small firms (4.7 percent) and lower percentages for medium firms (1.0 percent) 
and large firms (1.3 percent). Descriptive statistics on these variables are reported in Table 1. Small 
firms have on average fewer bank relationships and, not surprisingly, are younger than medium and 
large firms. All three age classes of firms report quite long average durations of main relationships -
- 17 years for small firms and almost 19 for medium and large firms. Nine out of ten firms have 
relationships that last more than five years. 
As proxies for firms’ performance, we use five different ratios: return on assets (ROA), return 
on equity (ROE), Interest Expense over Assets, Non-interest Expense over Assets, and Sales over 
Assets
6. Table 2 reports summary statistics on these performance measures broken down by firm 
size. Table 2 suggests that small firms have relatively better performance than the average as 
measured by all performance variables considered except ROA. 
Table 3 presents summary statistics on the performance measures broken down by size and 
number of bank relationships. Table 3 shows lower values of all performance indicators as the 
number of bank relationships increase both for the total sample and for small firms. This relation 
fades when considering medium and large firms. For medium firms, we find lower interest expense 
                                                 
6 ROA= (net earnings/ total assets)*100; ROE = (net earnings/ net worth)*100; Interest over Assets = (interest 
expenses/ total assets)*100; Non Interest over Assets = ((non interest expenses) /Total Assets)*100. Non interest 
expenses is complementary to interest expenses meaning that the two sum up to total expenses. Sales over Assets = (net 
sales/ total assets)*100.   10
over assets always is associated with a single relationship, while evidence on other variables is 
mixed. The same happens for large firms. 
B. Estimated  Relationships 
Because we have a relatively large number of observations, we initially estimate an unrestricted 
relationship between the number of banks and the performance variables. We then focus on a 
simple relationship that captures the features of the unrestricted relationship. 
The first step is the specification of regressions with each of the performance measures as a left-
hand-side variable, 
20
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In equation (1) we model the number of banks using dummy variables, bankh, equal to 1 if the 
firm has respectively 1, 2, 3, …., 20 bank relationships and 0 otherwise. The intercept reflects the 
constant term for firms with 21 to 50 relationships; ln_dur is the logarithm of the duration of the 
main relationship, ln_dur2 is the square of ln_dur, ln_size is the logarithm of the size of the firm in 
terms of net sales, ln_age is the logarithm of the age of the firm, ln_age2 is the square of ln_age, 
indi is a set of dummy variables for the industries and yeari is a set of dummy variables for the 
years
7. The left-hand-side variable DepVar is in turn ROA, ROE, interest expense over assets, 
noninterest expense over assets and sales relative to assets. Duration is included because a bank 
relationship can be more specifically defined along two dimensions: time and scope (Ongena and 
Smith, 2000). Duration is an observable measure of the strength of a bank relationship. The longer 
the relationship between a firm and a bank, the more valuable this relationship is and the lower is 
the firm’s incentive to initiate an additional relationship (Farinha and Santos, 2002).  Age is 
included because it is likely to affect loan rates, with older firms receiving more favourable terms 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Ongena and Smith, 2000). Moreover, if building relationships takes 
                                                 
7 Industries have been grouped using the Ateco 1998 classification corresponding to NACE rev. 1.1.   11
time, multiple banking relationships can be positively correlated with the number of relationships 
(Detragiache, Garella and Guiso, 2000). This regression is estimated on the total sample and on the 
subsamples of small, medium and large firms
8. While ordinary least squares would not be 
appropriate for estimating the effects of arbitrary changes in the number of bank relationships, this 
estimation strategy is fine for estimating the projection of the performance variables on the number 
of banks and for inferring the linear relationship between the performance variables and the number 
of relationships
9. 
We then estimate a restricted equation (2) in which the number of bank relationships is 
represented by a second-order polynomial.
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where ln_bank is the logarithm of the number of banks and ln_bank2 is the square of the logarithm 
of the number of banks. 
Table 4 reports the results of F-tests to test restricting the general regression with dummies (1) 
to the regression with a second-order polynomial (2) for each of the performance variables. The p-
values provide mixed evidence, with the number of banks in some instances seeming not to be well 
summarised by a second-order polynomial function of the number of banks. On the other hand, 
given the large number of observations, it is possible that these differences are statistically but not 
economically significant. 
We plot the values of the implied coefficients for the performance variables by number of banks 
in Figures 1 to 4 for all banks and for the three size classes. The graphs in these figures, each of 
which includes the coefficients of the dummy variables and the values of implied coefficient of the 
                                                 
8 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
9  For example, the variation in the number of relationships in our data seldom if ever is due to liquidity problems at 
banks. Ordinary least squares would provide a consistent estimator of the effect of such liquidity problems only if the 
effect of such problems on the number of relationships and performance were the same as the estimated relationship due 
to other factors. 
10  Estimation with the number of banks and with the natural logarithm of number of banks indicated that the natural 
logarithm fits better.   12
second-order polynomial, make it possible to examine the differences between the two estimated 
relationships and decide on the economic significance of deviations from the restricted equation. 
The polynomial is a reasonably close approximation for about ten or fewer bank relationships. The 
dummy variables estimate a more erratic relationship between the performance variables and the 
number of relationships as the number of relationships increases. This is not surprising, given that 
most of the banks have five or fewer relationships and as few as three firms underlie the estimated 
coefficients of the dummy variables at higher numbers of relationships. For example, there are only 
three small firms with 20 bank relationships, which makes it hard to know what to make of the 
substantially different coefficients shown in Figure 2 for 20 relationships than for fewer 
relationships. 
Overall, we conclude that the simple function well approximates the more general estimated 
relationship and focus on those results. The p-values are mixed, but the estimated effects for the 
numbers of relationships are quite similar for numbers of relationships with many observations. 
The figures show generally consistent results for the small firms, which are the largest part of 
the sample of all firms. ROA and ROE generally decline with the number of relationships, interest 
expense over assets generally increases, non interest expense over assets shows some evidence of 
decreasing as the number of relationships increases, and sales over assets decrease. 
Table 5 reports the regressions including the logarithm of the number of banks linearly and 
squared
11. F-statistics indicate that the estimated coefficients of the number of banks are statistically 
significant for all regressions for small and medium firms at any usual significance level. The F-
statistics indicate that, for the largest firms, the number of banks is statistically significant at the five 
percent significance level for ROA and interest expense over assets and at the 5.2 percent level for 
ROE. Figures 1 through 4 show that these relationships generally are economically significant as 
well, with the relationships most marked for small firms and hardly apparent for the large firms. 
These figures also show that a larger number of bank relationships is associated with lower ROA, 
                                                 
11  Results of the unrestricted regressions with dummy variables are available upon request.   13
ROE, higher interest expense over assets, lower non-interest expense over assets and lower sales 
over assets. These results support the hypothesis that better performing firms are more likely to 
have a smaller number of bank relationships than worse performing firms. This indicates that the 
benefits in terms of reduction of information asymmetries and agency problems of fewer 
relationships seems to outweigh the negative effects connected to hold-up problems. The clear 
negative relationship between firms’ performance and the number of bank relationships for small 
firms also suggests how multiple bank relationships are associated with worse performance by 
small firms. Due to the heavy reliance of this group of firms on bank credit, the lower cost or the 
greater availability of credit due to efficient gathering of information deriving from a close 
relationship acquires a great importance. 
F-statistics also indicate that the duration of the main relationship is important for these 
performance variables, as is the age of the firm. Although our results do not draw a clear path of the 
interaction between duration, age and firms’ performance, the values of the F-statistics clearly 
suggest how these measures add important elements in explaining the relationship between the 
number of bank relationships and firms’ performances, which is the main task of this paper. The 
duration of the lending relationship and the age of the firm become measures of the information 
generated over time that represent the possibility for the bank to gain private information about the 
borrower and the risk for the latter to be locked in that relationship. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we empirically study the consequences of firms’ financing strategy in terms of the 
relationship between the number of lenders and a firms’ performance, including an analysis of 
possible differential effects related to firms’ sizes. We assess the issue using regression analysis for 
data on Italian manufacturers. This sample of firms has three distinctive features compared to prior 
data used: 1. almost 75 percent of the firms are small, with fewer than 50 workers, 2. almost 99   14
percent of the firms are not listed on a stock exchange, and 3. four percent of the firms have a single 
bank relationship and 66 percent have five or fewer relationships.  
We find that firms’ performance based on return on assets and equity decreases as the number 
of bank relationships increases, and this negative association between firms’ performance and the 
number of relationships is strongest for small firms. We also find that interest expense over assets 
increases with the number of relationships, which may indicate a higher interest rate or simply more 
borrowing. The estimated negative association between multiple bank relationships and firms’ 
performance is consistent with some previous results (Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri, 1998; Degryse 
and Ongena, 2001; Fok, Chang and Lee, 2004; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). 
Our results are consistent with the positive value of fewer bank relationships in reducing 
information asymmetries and agency problems, with these positive effects outweighing hold-up 
problems. This is particularly so for small firms.   15
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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banks duration age banks duration age banks duration age banks duration age
mean 4.4 17.0 22.2 7.2 19.8 29.7 10.5 19.3 37.9 5.2 17.6 24.5
median 4 15 19 6 20 26 10 15 32 4 15 20
sd 2.5 12.0 16.6 4.0 13.2 19.8 7.1 16.2 28.0 3.6 12.5 18.6
m i n  111 111 111 111
max 33 191 312 35 100 182 50 100 171 50 191 312
obs. 8200 7790 8236 1837 1712 1850 599 509 678 10636 10011 10764
Table 1
Small Medium
Descriptive statistics of the Capitalia sample
Large All




mean median sd min max mean median sd min max
ROA 2.57 0.95 4.33 -11.35 29.80 2.54 0.85 4.41 -11.35 29.80
ROE 9.90 5.51 15.60 -20.00 99.05 10.14 5.45 16.14 -20.00 99.05
Interest over 
Assets
2.34 2.03 1.91 0 62.06 2.41 2.08 1.87 0 26.34
Non interest 
over Assets
55.94 50.69 28.63 1.33 267.90 57.94 53.23 29.74 1.33 267.90
Sales over 
Assets
125.51 119.71 47.10 20.04 299.39 129.34 124.66 48.73 20.04 299.39
mean median sd min max mean median sd min max
ROA 2.51 1.09 4.01 -7.02 26.03 3.11 2.11 4.13 -11.03 25.10
ROE 8.87 5.05 13.94 -19.97 98.26 9.71 7.58 12.87 -19.59 85.77
Interest over 
Assets
2.16 1.90 2.20 0 62.06 2.09 1.85 1.44 0 13.87
Non interest 
over Assets
51.20 46.56 24.93 5.23 219.10 44.59 41.72 18.42 6.01 164.74
Sales over 
Assets
115.87 110.65 39.82 24.28 298.13 105.20 103.63 34.83 21.96 289.25
Table 2
Sample period is 1998-2000. Firm-year obs. 10764. Size is based on number of employees (small: < 50
employees, medium: 51 - 250, Large: > 250). ROA: % ratio of Net earnings to Total assets.ROE: % ratio of
Net earnings to Net worth. Interest over assets: % ratio of Interest expenses to Total assets. Non Interest over
assets: % ratio of Non interest expenses to Total assets. Sales over assets: % ratio of Net sales to Total assets. 
Summary statistics of firms performance indicators broken down by size
Small (obs. 8236)
Medium (obs. 1850) Large (obs. 678)
All (obs. 10764)
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mean median sd min max n. mean median sd min max n. mean median sd min max n.
ROA 3.79 1.85 5.51 -8.98 28.66 408 2.82 1.08 4.62 -11.35 29.80 6738 1.97 0.71 3.46 -10.84 27.78 3618
ROE 12.74 8.65 17.44 -19.55 96.23 408 10.45 5.88 16.14 -19.92 95.65 6738 8.54 4.59 14.18 -20.00 99.05 3618
Interest over 
Assets
1.45 0.88 1.55 0 10.28 408 2.17 1.82 1.84 0 26.34 6738 2.77 2.48 1.99 0 62.06 3618
Non interest 
over Assets
59.87 53.61 31.79 7.46 206.08 408 58.73 54.10 29.94 1.33 244.91 6738 50.29 46.10 24.66 3.20 267.90 3618
Sales over 
Assets
132.60 130.97 54.65 24.03 291.47 408 128.31 122.80 48.67 20.04 299.39 6738 119.49 113.95 42.38 21.96 296.37 3618
ROA 3.91 1.85 5.62 -8.98 28.66 381 2.75 0.98 4.61 -11.35 29.80 5831 1.65 0.50 3.31 -6.17 27.78 2024
ROE 12.93 8.47 17.66 -19.55 96.23 381 10.53 5.83 16.40 -19.92 95.65 5831 8.51 3.94 14.90 -20.00 99.05 2024
Interest over 
Assets
1.45 0.86 1.58 0 10.28 381 2.24 1.88 1.87 0 26.34 5831 3.06 2.82 1.72 0 12.18 2024
Non interest 
over Assets
60.72 54.64 31.75 7.46 206.08 381 59.47 55.35 30.24 1.33 244.91 5831 53.00 48.24 27.26 3.20 267.90 2024
Sales over 
Assets
133.22 130.82 55.78 24.03 291.47 381 130.23 125.57 49.35 20.04 299.39 5831 126.06 121.24 45.23 22.41 295.24 2024
ROA 0.78 0.00 2.81 -3.86 6.84 19 3.28 1.61 4.82 -7.02 26.03 747 2.01 0.86 3.26 -6.42 22.65 1084
ROE 6.64 0.00 14.81 -11.76 41.38 19 10.20 5.91 14.81 -19.27 88.10 747 7.99 4.55 13.21 -19.97 98.26 1084
Interest over 
Assets
1.29 1.08 1.02 0 3.57 19 1.70 1.42 1.58 0 23.52 747 2.49 2.27 2.50 0 62.06 1084
Non interest 
over Assets
49.84 43.23 33.82 11.05 147.57 19 55.10 48.84 28.10 5.23 219.10 747 48.54 45.01 21.92 8.02 199.32 1084
Sales over 
Assets
111.94 112.18 33.35 37.41 164.40 19 117.76 110.61 42.48 26.22 298.13 747 114.64 110.68 37.96 24.28 296.37 1084
ROA 5.28 4.30 1.98 3.53 8.52 8 2.89 1.96 4.19 -11.03 22.63 160 3.15 2.13 4.14 -10.84 25.10 510
ROE 18.35 19.44 7.00 10.07 27.43 8 8.85 6.82 12.21 -18.98 66.75 160 9.85 7.61 13.10 -19.59 85.77 510
Interest over 
Assets
1.75 1.20 1.46 0.45 4.16 8 1.82 1.59 1.34 0 6.28 160 2.18 1.92 1.46 0 13.87 510
Non interest 
over Assets
42.74 33.64 21.37 25.95 78.66 8 48.83 46.30 23.84 14.56 164.74 160 43.29 40.37 16.13 6.01 102.61 510
Sales over 
Assets
151.91 146.72 15.66 132.72 176.21 8 107.48 105.06 38.97 25.25 289.25 160 103.75 101.74 33.13 21.96 247.83 510
Table 3
Sample period is 1998-2000. Firm-year obs. 10764. Size is based on number of employees (small: < 50 employees, medium: 51 - 250, Large: > 250). Bank relationship: firms have been asked which was the
number of banks with which they had commercial relationships at the end of 2000. ROA: % ratio of Net earnings to Total assets.ROE: % ratio of Net earnings to Net worth. Interest over assets: % ratio of
Interest expenses to Total assets. Non Interest over assets: % ratio of Non interest expenses to Total assets. Sales over assets: % ratio of Net sales to Total assets.
Summary statistics of firms performance indicators broken down by size and number of bank relationships
Medium
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Table 4 
P-values of the F statistics on the significance of restrictions from (1) to (2). 
 
 






Assets  num. DF  den. DF 
All  0.018 0.316  <0.001  0.024 0.005  18 9949 
Small  0.02 0.243  <0.001  0.969  0.015 18 7733 
Medium  0.077 0.034 0.321  <0.001  <0.01  18 1663 
Large  0.009 <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  18  463 




Dependent variables are % – Standard errors in parenthesis. In addition to variables reported, each regression also 
includes 19 industries dummies (see note 5) and two year dummies accounting for 1998 and 1999 since we are working 
with firm-years observations.  
The second part of the table reports p-values of F-tests performed comparing equation (2) with in turn: (a) same 
specification without banks variables, (b) same specification without duration variables; (c) same specification without 
age variables.  
All Firms 






ln_bank -0.983  -0.141  0.940  0.146  4.463 
 (0.232)**  (0.841) (0.101)** (1.463) (2.518) 
ln_bank2  -0.263 -1.254 0.025 -0.911 -4.810 
 (0.079)**  (0.286)**  (0.034) (0.498)  (0.857)** 
ln_dur  0.209 -0.890 -0.197 9.275 18.591 
 (0.297)  (1.079) (0.130)  (1.877)**  (3.230)** 
ln_dur2  -0.015 0.246 0.027 -1.578 -2.960 
 (0.060)  (0.217) (0.026)  (0.378)**  (0.650)** 
ln_size  0.858 2.077 -0.362 -3.931 3.145 
  (0.048)** (0.173)** (0.021)** (0.302)** (0.519)** 
ln_age  0.766 -6.881 0.112 -4.648 -4.647 
 (0.320)*  (1.161)**  (0.140)  (2.019)*  (3.474) 
ln_age2  -0.169 0.678 -0.058 0.419 -0.847 
 (0.056)**  (0.204)**  (0.025)* (0.354)  (0.610) 
constant  -3.509 10.313 4.480 88.564  101.255 
  (0.686)** (2.492)** (0.300)** (4.335)** (7.459)** 
observations  9996 9996 9996 9996 9996 
r-squared  0.075 0.056 0.105 0.159 0.077 
F-test degrees of freedom (2,9967)       
(1) no bank   <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
(2)  no  duration  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
(3)  no  age  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
* significant at 5 percent level; ** significant at 1 percent level 
 
Small Firms 






ln_bank -1.047  -0.443  0.845  3.723  4.667 
 (0.290)**  (1.065)  (0.119)**  (1.884)*  (3.168) 
ln_bank2  -0.365 -1.426 0.119 -2.484 -6.405 
  (0.109)** (0.402)** (0.045)** (0.712)** (1.197)** 
ln_dur 0.048  -0.647  0.061  12.368  23.275 
 (0.355)  (1.304) (0.146)  (2.307)**  (3.880)** 
ln_dur2  0.006  0.237 -0.025 -2.093 -3.912 
 (0.072)  (0.264) (0.030)  (0.468)**  (0.787)** 
ln_size 1.601  4.465  -0.517  -4.514  15.959 
  (0.083)** (0.304)** (0.034)** (0.538)** (0.905)** 
ln_age  0.623 -8.678 0.094 -6.144 -9.511 
 (0.373)  (1.372)**  (0.154)  (2.428)*  (4.083)* 
ln_age2  -0.134 0.948 -0.048 0.593 -0.055 
 (0.067)*  (0.245)**  (0.027) (0.434) (0.729) 
constant -8.675  -5.668  5.323  88.702  4.814 
 (0.907)**  (3.335) (0.374)**  (5.901)** (9.924) 
observations  7778 7778 7778 7778 7778 
r-squared  0.089 0.069 0.132 0.158 0.106 
F-test numerator and denominator DF (2,7749)       
(a)    no  bank <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
(b)    no  duration  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
(c)  no age  0.063  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001  <0.001 
*significant at 5 percent level; ** significant at 1 percent level   23
Table 5 (continued) 
Estimated Regressions 
 
Dependent variables are % – Standard errors in parenthesis. In addition to variables reported, each regression also 
includes 19 industries dummies (see note 5) and two year dummies accounting for 1998 and 1999 since we are working 
with firm-years observations.  
The second part of the table reports p-values of F-tests performed comparing equation (2) with in turn: (a) same 
specification without banks variables, (b) same specification without duration variables; (c) same specification without 
age variables.  
Medium Firms 






ln_bank  0.727 1.112 0.559 5.017  15.201 
 (0.701)  (2.457) (0.410) (4.100) (7.073)* 
ln_bank2  -0.682 -1.561 0.101 -2.093 -6.649 
 (0.204)**  (0.715)*  (0.119) (1.193)  (2.057)** 
ln_dur  0.637 -0.608 -0.743 5.668 18.376 
 (0.684)  (2.400) (0.400) (4.004) (6.908)** 
ln_dur2  -0.070 0.145 0.148 -1.121 -2.765 
 (0.134)  (0.468) (0.078) (0.782) (1.348)* 
ln_size  1.199 3.098 -0.243 -7.229 7.268 
  (0.136)** (0.476)** (0.079)** (0.794)** (1.370)** 
ln_age  -0.128 -5.133 0.084 -8.556 -3.862 
 (0.781)  (2.739) (0.457) (4.570) (7.883) 
ln_age2  -0.059 0.472 -0.056 1.181 -0.057 
 (0.131)  (0.458) (0.076) (0.765) (1.319) 
constant -7.864  -4.552  4.460  128.577  29.284 
 (1.899)**  (6.660)  (1.111)**  (11.112)**  (19.169) 
observations  1709 1709 1709 1709 1709 
r-squared  0.156 0.115 0.066 0.191 0.103 
F-test numerator and denominator DF (2,1680)       
(a)    no  bank   <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
(b)    no  duration  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
(c)  no age  0.012  <0.001  0.025  0.064  0.034 
*significant at 5 percent level; ** significant at 1 percent level 
 
Large Firms 






ln_bank  0.412 2.296 0.673 -7.349  -10.896 
 (1.092)  (3.651) (0.421) (4.634) (9.046) 
ln_bank2 -0.296  -1.110  -0.076  1.327  2.036 
 (0.268)  (0.896) (0.103) (1.137) (2.219) 
ln_dur  0.712 -2.711 -0.885 -0.266 -9.507 
 (0.796)  (2.661) (0.307)** (3.377) (6.592) 
ln_dur2  -0.167 0.383 0.165 0.341 2.224 
 (0.161)  (0.540) (0.062)** (0.685) (1.337) 
ln_size  0.658 2.286 0.148 -4.192 2.142 
 (0.222)**  (0.742)**  (0.085) (0.941)** (1.837) 
ln_age 2.385  2.355  -0.179  14.060  13.828 
 (1.054)*  (3.524) (0.406)  (4.473)** (8.731) 
ln_age2  -0.366 -0.372 -0.025 -2.176 -2.311 
 (0.177)*  (0.592) (0.068)  (0.751)** (1.466) 
constant -7.775  -14.453  1.015  82.766  102.971 
 (3.295)*  (11.011)  (1.269)  (13.977)**  (27.281)** 
observations  509 509 509 509 509 
r-squared  0.123 0.101 0.153 0.187 0.166 
F-test numerator and denominator DF (2,481)       
(a)    no  bank    0.022 0.052 0.003 0.117 0.324 
(b)    no  duration  <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 
(c)    no  age  0.067 0.796 0.003 0.005 0.282 
*significant at 5 percent level; ** significant at 1 percent level   24
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